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BOOK REVIEW
FREEDOM'S POLITICS: A REVIEW ESSAY OF
RONALD DWORKIN'S FREEDOM'S LAW:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION
Gregory Bassham*
Ronald Dworkin is America's leading philosopher of law-arguably the greatest philosopher of law this country has ever produced.
The work which brought him to prominence thirty years ago and led
to his appointment as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, his critique of H.L.A. Hart's then-dominant version of legal positivism,1 remains at the center of contemporary debates over the
nature and sources of law.2 His early efforts in Hard Cases3 and else-

where to develop a "third theory of law," a theory which avoids the
well-known difficulties with both legal positivism and natural law theory, continues to be a major focus of academic debate over judicial
lawmaking, legal objectivity, and the relationship between law and morality.4 And Dworkin's scholarly interests and accomplishments have
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, King's College (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.). I am
grateful to Bill Irwin, John Robinson, and Paul Weithman for helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this paper.
1 See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967).
2 For a useful sampling of critical responses, see RONALD DwoRmIN AND CONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE (Marshall Cohen ed., 1983).
3 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1975).
4 See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FATH 171-91 (1992); KENT
GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 215-31 (1992); DAVIS LYONS, ETHICS AND THE
RUL= OF LA-w 61-109 (1984);JEFFmE G. MURPHY &JULES L. CoLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 39-51 (rev. ed. 1990); THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAw: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS wITH CoMMENTARY 70-106 (Frederick
Schauer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OFJUR1SPRUDENcE 21-26, 197-203 (1990);JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORr= OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND MORAry 54-77 (1979).
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by no means been limited to philosophy of law or legal theory: his
contributions to moral and political philosophy-most notably, his
ongoing work in defense of a liberal theory of equality 5-are widely
6
considered to be outstanding.
In recent years, however, Dworkin's work has met with generally
much more mixed reviews. Many critics were unpersuaded that the
"interpretive turn"7 Dworkin's general theory of law took in Law's Empires was a genuine advance over the accounts of law and the character
of legal disagreements offered in his previous work.9 Life's Dominion,'0
Dworkin's 1993 book on the abortion and euthanasia controversies,
has been widely criticized 1 for the inherent implausibility of its cen5 See Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We the People in Court,
28 ALBERTA L. REV. 324 (1990) [hereinafter Equality, Democracy, and Constitution];Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in 11 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES (1987); Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, 1 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 24 (1983);
Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1989); Ronald Dworkin,
What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald
Dworkin, What is Equality?Part2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. Ar. 283 (1981);
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?Part3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1987);
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?Part4: PoliticalEquality, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1987).
6 See, e.g., STEPHEN GuEST, RONALD DWORKIN 225-308 (1991) (discussing Dworkin's theory of equality and his defense of political liberalism); WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY PoLrIcAL PHILOSOPHY- AN INTRODUCTION 76-85 (1990) (discussing
Dworkin's liberal theory of economic justice).
7 Ken Kress, The Interpretive Turn, 97 ETHICS 834 (1987) (book review). In Law's
Empire, Dworkin argues that the concept of law is an "interpretive concept" in the
sense that, in order to explicate the meaning of "law," one must provide a general
(and contestable) interpretation of the fundamental "point" of legal practices. See
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 90-94 (1986) [hereinafter LAW's EMPIRE].
8 LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 7.
9 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHip 247-59 (1988); Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang Interpretationin Law
and Literature,60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Stanley Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEx. L. REv.
299 (1983); Jessica Lane, The Poetics of Legal Interpretation, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 197
(1987) (book review); Barbara Baum Levenbook, The Sustained Dworkin, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1108 (1986) (book review).
10 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1994) [hereinafter LIFE's DOMINION].
11 See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 329, 380-85 (1993); Robert P. George, Book Review, 88 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV.
444, 445 (1994); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Review Essay: Beyond Dworkin's Dominions:
Investments, Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEX. L. REv. 559,
570-607 (1994) (book review); Frances M. Kamm, Book Review Essay: Abortion and the
Value of Life: A Discussion of Life's Dominion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 160, 167-70 (1995);
Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity ofLife, 103 YALE L.J. 2049, 2078-80 (1994) (book review);
Stephen L. Carter, Strife's Dominion, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9, 1993, at 86, 91-92 (book
review).
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tral claim: that most opponents of abortion fundamentally misunderstand the ground of their own convictions about abortion, and do not
really believe (however strongly they may insist) that pre-viable fetuses
have rights and interests of their own. 12 And many commentators
have complained of a troubling tendency in Dworkin's recent writings
to characterize opponents' views in ways that make them appear
I3
weaker or more extreme than they really are.
Freedom's Law1 4 is not likely to boost Dworkin's reputation, at least
among his academic readers. Like his first two books, Freedom's Law is
a collection of previously published essays, most of which appeared
originally in The New York Review of Books. The one largely new piece
in the book is a substantial introductory essay in which Dworkin offers
his most fully developed argument to date for what he calls "the moral
reading" of the Constitution. On this way of reading the Constitution,
the broadly stated individual rights guarantees of the Constitution
(freedom of speech, equal protection of the laws, etc.) should be understood as setting forth abstract moral principles which judges must
interpret and apply in ways faithfu not only to our constitutional tradition, but also to their own views of political morality. 15 Such an approach raises, in particularly acute form, concerns about the
democratic legitimacy of unelected judges second-guessing the value
judgments of the people's elected representatives. For readers of
Dworkin's previous books, perhaps the most interesting feature of the
12 See LIuE's

DOMINION, supra note 10, at 10-21.
13 See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINEB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 119 (1987); Daniel A.
Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MIINN. L. Ray. 1331, 1343-47 (1988);
John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire, 6 LAW & PHIL. 357, 367-70
(1987); James DA. Boyle, Legal Fiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1013, 1021 (1987) (book
review).; John Stick, LiteraryImperialism: Assessing the Results of Dworkin'sInterpretiveTurn
in Law's Empire, 34 U.C.LA. L. REV. 371, 417-18, 428 (1986) (book review); Cass R.
Sunstein, Earl Warren is Dead, NEW REPUBLIC, May 13, 1996, at 35, 38 (book review).
Consider, by way of example, the following characterization of constitutional judicial "activism" in Law's Empire "An activist judge would ignore the Constitution's
text, the history of its enactment, prior decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting
it, and long-standing traditions of our political culture. He would ignore all these in
order to impose on other branches of government his own views of what justice demands." LAW'S EMPIRE, supranote 7, at 378. By defining activism in this extreme way,
Dworkin manages to avoid the standard charge that he himself endorses a particularly
robust form of activism-but only at the cost of rendering the concept all but useless
in the context of contemporary jurisprudential debate. For a less tendentious definition of activism, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 137 (1978) [hereinafter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
14 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDoM's LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrruTION (1996) [hereinafter FRrI)oOM'S LAW].
15 Id. at 7-12.
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book is the boldly original response Dworkin offers to this perennial
I6
constitutional dilemma.
Dworkin divides his essays into four parts. In the Introduction
(The Moral Reading and the MajoritarianPremise), Dworkin argues for
the moral reading of the Constitution and defends it against the
charge that it is anti-democratic. Part I (Life,Death, and Race) focuses
mainly on the abortion controversy, but also includes forceful critiques of recent Supreme Court decisions on "the right to die"' 7 and
affirmative action.' 8 Part II (Speech, Conscience, and Sex) features essays
on freedom of speech, including illuminating discussions of libel law,
pornography, and academic freedom. Part III (Judges) reprints several acerbic essays on Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas, as well as a
gracious tribute to Learned Hand, the legendary appellate judge for
whom Dworkin once clerked.
I will not attempt in this review to do justice to the many different
issues taken up in Freedom's Law. For the most part, the essays collected in the book add little to what Dworkin has said more substantively in other places. Instead, I'll focus on the one topic likely to be
of greatest interest to legal theorists and constitutional scholars: Dworkin's proposed moral reading of the Constitution.
In Part I of this review, I attempt to clarify what Dworkin means
by the moral reading and draw attention to a crucial ambiguity in the
way Dworkin characterizes what such a reading amounts to. In Part II,
I assess the cogency of Dworkin's various arguments for the moral
reading and argue that none of them provides convincing support for
the strong version of the moral reading on which Dworkin relies in
defending his liberal views on abortion and other controversial constitutional issues. Finally, in Part III, I examine Dworkin's argument that
the moral reading is not undemocratic, and I argue that it rests on a
false choice Dworkin poses between rival conceptions of democracy.

16 See infra Part III (discussing Dworkin's attempt to reconcile activist judicial review with democratic principles by reconceptualizing the nature of democracy).

17 FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 130-46 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Director,MiksouriDepartment of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), upholding the right of a state to apply a "dear and convincing" standard of proof in
proceedings in which a guardian seeks to discontinue life-sustaining treatment of a
person in a persistent vegetative state).
18 Id-at 155-61 (faulting recent Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action as
inconsistent with sound earlier rulings holding, in effect, that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 condemns both "subjective" (intended) and "structural" (unintended but institutionalized) discrimination).
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WHAT IS THE MoRAL READING?

Like most contemporary constitutions, the United States Constitution couches many individual rights guarantees in broad, "majestic
generalities." 19 The First Amendment protects "freedom of speech"
and "freedom of religion"; the Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures"; the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee "due process of law"; the Eighth Amendment forbids
the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments"; and the Fourteenth Amendment insists on "equal protection of the laws." According to the moral reading, as Dworkin initially explains it, each of uscitizens, lawyers, elected officials, and judges-should "interpret and
apply these abstract clauses on the understanding that they invoke
20
moral principles about political decency and justice."
When characterized in this very general way, the moral reading,
as Dworkin convincingly argues, has much to recommend it. First, the
very generality and abstractness of the language naturally suggests a
broad rather than a narrow interpretation of these clauses. 21 To read,
for example, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" as extending only to issues of racial equality, as
Robert Bork2 2 and Raoul Berger 23 do, might be a defensible reading
on purely originalist grounds. But it is scarcely one that fits easily with
the broad language the framers enacted.
Second, history suggests that (in many cases, at least) the framers
intended their abstract phrases to lay down general principles rather
24
than highly detailed rules or specific historical conceptions. Just
how general a principle the framers may have intended to enact in a
19

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 627, 639 (1943).

20

FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 2.

21 Id. at 73-74; see also LiE's DOMINION, supra note 10, at 128-29.
22 See ROBERT BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: Tm POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 329-30 (1990) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should be restricted to
race and ethnicity, except in cases in which a challenged legislative distinction wholly
lacks a rational basis).
23 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 166-92 (1977) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause
extends only to specific guarantees of racial equality enumerated in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act).
24

FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 268-69; see also LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note

10, at 133-36. Dworkin emphasizes that we "turn to history to answer the question of
what [the framers] intended to say, not the different question of what otherintentions
they had." FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 10. Only in this very weak sense does
Dworkin endorse appeals to framers' intent.
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given provision is often a matter of considerable historical debate.2 5
But everything we know of both constitutional history and human
communication, 26 Dworkin argues, suggests that the framers did not
intend abstract expressions such as "freedom of religion," 27 "unreasonable searches and seizures," 28 and 'just compensation" 29 to be
"treated only as coded messages or shorthand statements of very concrete, detailed historical agreements."3 0
Third, the moral reading has long been an established feature of
our constitutional tradition and practice.3 1 As Chief Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone wrote in 1941:
[I] n determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to
a new subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with
which the framers were not familiar. For in setting up an enduring
framework of government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men,
those fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses.
Hence we read its words, not as we read legislative codes which are
subject to continuous revision with the changing course of events,
25
TION

See generally LEONARD
(1988); JACK

N.

W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAmERs' CONsTrruRAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEALS IN THE MAK-

ING OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1996).

26 As Dworkin argues in a famous passage, there is often an important distinction
between what people say and what they expect will be the result of their saying it. He
writes:
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others
unfairly. I no doubt have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would not accept that my "meaning" was limited to these examples, for two reasons. First I would expect my children to apply my
instructions to situations I had not and could not have thought about. Second, I stand ready to admit that some particular act I had thought fair when
I spoke was in fact unfair, or vice versa, if one of my children is able to
convince me of that later; in that case I should want to say that my instructions covered the case he cited, not that I had changed my instructions. I
might say that I meant the family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not
by any specific conception of fairness I might have had in mind.
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 13, at 134.
27 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
28 Id. amend. IV.
29 Id. amend. V.
30 LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 10, at 128.
31 FREEDOM's LAW, supra note 14, at 2-4. Dworkin suggests that general acceptance of the moral reading among lawyers and judges helps to explain why it is "reasonably easy to classify judges as liberal or conservative," as well as to account for
"more fine-grained differences in constitutional interpretation that cut across the
conventional liberal-conservative divide." Id. at 2-3; cf LIFE's DOMINION, supra note
10, at 124-28.
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but as the revelation of great purposes which were intended to be
achieved by the Constitution as a continuing instrument of
32
government.

-

In this spirit, modern-day courts have consistently interpreted the

Constitution's abstract individual rights guarantees as setting forth
general principles that provide textual support for more concrete
principles of constitutional doctrine. For example, in current First
Amendment doctrine, the principle that government may not prohibit flag burning as a form of symbolic political protest has been held
to follow from a more general principle that government "may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 33 This general principle, in
turn, is viewed by courts as being grounded in a still more abstract
command of the First Amendment-the principle, roughly, that the
State may not dictate what its citizens say or read or think, absent a
4
sufficiently compelling justification.3
Finally, Dworkin argues that the moral reading is more plausible
and attractive than what he claims are the only principled alternatives
to it:passivism and originalism.3 5 "Passivism" is Dworkin's term for a
particularly strict version of constitutional judicial restraint, a view advocated most famously by Judge Learned Hand.3 6 According to
Hand, while the moral reading may be correct as an interpretation of
what certain clauses of the Constitution mean, democratic theory demands that judges defer to whatever practical constructions of the
37
Constitution the political branches of government adopt.

Dworkin rejects passivism on several grounds. First, such an extreme form ofjudicial restraint is clearly inconsistent with settled con32 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); cf National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Great
concepts like . . . 'due process of law,' 'liberty,' 'property,' were purposely left to

gather meaning from experience.").
33 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
34 See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AiMRicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 789-94 (2d ed.
1988). There are well-known difficulties in formulating a general theory of free
speech. SeeTRm, supra, at 785-89; Stephen Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic
Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212

(1983). For Dworkin's attempt to identify the fundamental purposes of the free
speech and press clauses, see FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 14, at 199-204.
35 FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 12-15; see also LIuE's DOMINION, supra note

10, at xi-xii, 119-25.

36 See LEARNED HAND,THE BnI.L

OF IRIGHTs

49, 66 (1958).

37 The only exception Hand recognizes is when judicial intervention is needed to
prevent or resolve paralyzing conflicts that result when one department of government trenches on the prescribed powers of another. Id. at 66.
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stitutional practice;38 courts have long recognized, in the oft-quoted
words of Justice Robert Jackson, that "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts." 39 Further, passivism cannot be reconciled with Brown v. Board

of Education40 and many other decisions "now almost universally
thought not only sound but shining examples of our constitutional
structure working at its best."4 1 Finally, passivism rests on the false
assumption that judicial review is inherently a "deviant institution in
the American democracy." 42 In fact, Dworkin argues, taking a cue
from John Hart Ely,4 3 democratic processes and the quality of public
deliberation may in some instances be enhanced "when final decisions.., are removed from ordinary politics and assigned to courts,
whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on the weight of
numbers or the balance of political influence." 44
Once we reject passivism, the only principled alternative to the
moral reading that remains, according to Dworkin, is originalism, the
view that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
"the framers' own assumptions and expectations about the correct application" 45 of the provisions they enacted. Such an approach appeals
to many conservatives, primarily because it imposes severe limits on
the ability ofjudges to substitute their own personal values and policy
preferences for those of the people's democratically elected representatives. 46 Originalism, however, is vulnerable to a host of familiar
objections, many of which Dworkin has perceptively discussed in ear-

38 FREEDOM'S
369-73.

LAW,

supra note 14, at 12; see also LAW's

EMPIRE,

supra note 7, at

39 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
40 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlawing segregated public schooling).
41 FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 13; see also LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 7, at
373-74.
42

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

THE BAR OF

43

POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1986).

SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:

A

THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

chs. 4-6 (1980).
44 FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 344.

45 Id. at 13. For a critique of this way of characterizing originalism, see infranotes
99-121 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 22, at 6; CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN
JUDIcIAL REVIEW 333-34 (rev. ed. 1994); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 699-706 (1976).
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Her work. 47 In Freedom's Law, Dworkin emphasizes three main objections: (a) that originalism is self-defeating, since there is persuasive
evidence that the framers did not intend their own understanding of
constitutional language to be binding on future interpreters;4 8 (b)
that originalism is flawed because it fails to recognize that the framers'
intentions can often be described at different levels of abstraction,
and that the framers' dominant intention must be presumed to have
been to use abstract language in its normal abstract sense; 49 and (c)
that originalism is inconsistent with our constitutional tradition, since
it "would condemn not only the Brown decision but many other
Supreme Court decisions that are now widely regarded as paradigms
of good constitutional interpretation."5 0
In summary, Dworkin defends the moral reading on four main
grounds: the abstract language of the relevant constitutional provisions, the linguistic intentions of the framers, constitutional tradition
and practice, and the indefensibility of what he claims are the only
principled alternatives.
There are, I think, serious difficulties with this last argument, for
reasons I will shortly explain. But on the whole Dworkin makes a
strong case for the moral reading as he initially describes it, that is, as
simply the view that the Constitution's abstractly phrased individual
rights guarantees should be read as invoking general moral principles.
The problem is that, as the book progresses, Dworkin gradually builds
more and more into his description of what the "moral reading" consists in or requires, until what emerges in the end is not a plausible
general theory of constitutional meaning but a complex and highly
controversial theory of constitutional adjudication.
47 See, e.g., LAw's EMPIRE, supranote 7, at 359-69; RONALD DwoRN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 38-57 (1985) [hereinafter A MA=R OF PRiNCIPLE]; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 13, at 134-35.

See FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 380 n.l(b). For similar arguments, see
63 (1987); H.Jefferson Powell,
The Original Understandingof OriginalIntenA 98 HARv. L. REv. 885, 902-24 (1985);
Mark Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers,36 BuFF. L. REv. 217,
219 (1987). Elsewhere, I have argued that this objection to originalism is unsuccessful. See GREGORY BAssRAm, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTrruTION: A PHEmosopHi48

ERvIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

CAL STUDY 67-71 (1992).
49 See FREEDOM'S LAWv, supra note 14, at 76, 291-305, 315; Cf LIFE's DOMINION,
supra note 10, at 137-38 (arguing that the framers "intended a great constitutional
adventure: that the United States be governed according to the correct understanding of what genuine liberty requires and of how government shows equal concern for
all its citizens").
50 FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 14, at 13; see also id. at 268-69.
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As Dworkin has it, the moral reading as a theory of constitutional
adjudication essentially involves a three step process ofjudicial reasoning. The first step consists in asking a threshold question: Did the
framers intend in the relevant provision to enact a general moral principle? Only if the answer is "yes," Dworkin says, is the moral reading
the appropriate interpretive approach. 5 '
Once it has been determined that the framers did intend to enact
a general moral principle, we next must ask: Which general principle?
"That further question," Dworkin says,
must be answered by constructing different elaborations of the [abstract phrases the framers used], each of which we can recognize as
a principle of political morality that might have won their respect,
most sense to attribute
and then by asking which of these it makes
52
to them, given everything else we know.

Historical research regarding the framers' intentions is relevant
to this process of practical elaboration, but not necessarily decisive,
for "constitutional interpretation must take into account past legal
and political practice as well as what the framers themselves intended
to say." 53 So, for example, even if historical investigation were to
show conclusively that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses were originally understood only to guarantee lawful prohas long excluded
cedures,M4 constitutional history, Dworkin claims,
55
clauses.
the
of
interpretation
eligible
that as an
Finally, "[t] he moral reading asks Uudges] to find the best conception of constitutional moral principles.., that fits the broad story
of America's historical record." 5 6 At this stage, judges must seek the
best theory of what the general principles identified earlier require.
Thus, for instance, if a judge were to decide (at step two) that the
general principle constitutionalized in the Equal Protection Clause is
that government must treat all persons subject to its dominion with
equal concern and respect,57 the task at this point would be to decide
what equal concern and respect, properly understood, requires in
cases of same-sex marriage, affirmative action, racially motivated redis51 Id. at 8.
52 Ia-at 9. For an example of this process of "elaboration," see LAW's
supra note 7, at 381-87.
53 FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 9-10.
54

55

EMPIRE,

See generally ELY, supra note 43, at 14-21.
FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 72-73.

56 Id at 11.
57

This is, in fact, Dworkin's preferred reading of the abstract command of the

Equal Protection Clause. See LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 381-82; see also FREEDOM'S
LAw, supra note 14, at 7-8.
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tricting, and other concrete equal-protection controversies that come
before courts.
Dworkin emphasizes thatjudges are not free simply to read their
own political preferences into the Constitution. A Marxist judge
could not properly declare, for example, that the "best conception" of
equal protection requires a radical redistribution of wealth. Rather,
judges are "disciplined, under the moral reading, by the requirement
of constitutional integrity."5 8 "Integrity" constrains judges in several
ways. First, it requires that judicial decisions be consistent with the
dominant lines of constitutional precedent and with the structural design of the Constitution as a whole.5 9 Second, it insists that judges
decide constitutional cases on the basis of principle, not policy or
political accommodation. 60 Finally, it demands that judges be willing
to apply the relevant principle consistently in other cases in which it is
fairly implicated. 6 1
A good constitutional interpretation, in short, must be principled, consistently applied, and must "fit" settled constitutional precedent and practice. But integrity requires something more ofjudges: it
demands that they interpret the Constitution and constitutional doctrine in the best light they can bear, so as to make them, all things
considered, the best they can be.6 2 In seeking such a "constructive"
interpretation, judges may not, once again, impose their own political
convictions as law; their task, in even the most difficult constitutional
cases, is not to invent the law but to apply it. But "law," as Dworkin
famously argues, includes more than simply the explicit content of
uncontroversial, settled law; it also includes the principles of political
morality that best explain and justify that settled law. 63 In deciding
constitutional cases, therefore, integrity demands that judges "seek to
identify the principles latent in the Constitution as a whole, and in
past judicial decisions applying the Constitution's abstract language,
in order to enforce the same principles in new areas and so make the
law steadily more coherent."6 In this way, Dworkin remarks, the

58 FRREroM's LAW, supra note 14, at 10.
59 Id. at 10, 83.
60 Id. at 83.
61 Id. For a fuller account of "integrity" in law, see LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 7,
chs. 6-11.
62 See LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 255, 379.
63 See id. at 227; see also A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 47, at 143-44; TAYING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 13, at 105-23.
64 FREDoM's LAw, supra note 14, at 53.
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moral reading "brings political morality into the heart of constitu65
tional law."
II.

How

SOUND IS THE MORAL READING?

As the foregoing summary suggests, Dworkin characterizes the
moral reading in two very different ways, which I shall refer to as the
"weak" and the "strong" versions of the reading. The weak version
amounts to a plausible and widely accepted view of how to read certain constitutional provisions; it asserts that the Constitution's abstract
individual rights provisions should be read as embodying general
moral principles rather than detailed rules that, for example, constitutionalize the concrete expectations of the framers. The strong version
is very different; it asserts that judges are bound by "integrity" to seek
and apply the "best conception" of the Constitution's abstract clauses,
and that the "best conception" is one that best justifies and explains
settled constitutional doctrine and practice. This stronger version relies on a complex and deeply controversial theory of law and legal
reasoning; it assumes, for example, that "the law" includes a wide array of political principles that may never have been promulgated or
even explicitly recognized by legal officials. It also assumes, as we have
seen, that judges should act on their own best understanding of what
the Constitution's abstract clauses require, without significant deference to either popular opinion or rival interpretations of the political
branches. The specter of rule "by a bevy of Platonic guardians" 66 is
thus raised in particularly acute form by the strong version of Dworkin's moral reading. How does Dworkin seek tojustify such a controversial theory of judicial responsibility?
The surprising answer is that Dworkin offers no real argument in
Freedom's Law that provides substantial support for the strong version
of the moral reading. Each of the four arguments discussed earlierthe appeals to constitutional language, framers' intent, constitutional
practice, and the lack of principled alternatives-considered either
alone or in combination, supports at most the weak version of the
moral reading. Yet it is the strong version on which Dworkin crucially
relies in defending his liberal views on abortion, euthanasia, affirmative action, hate speech, pornography, and other hotly debated constitutional issues.
Dworkin's first argument-that the language of many constitutional rights guarantees is abstract-is a truism admitted by constitu65
66

Id. at 2.
HAND, supra note 36, at 73.
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tional theorists of all political persuasions. 6 7 Clearly, nothing as
complex and contentious as Dworkin's strong version of the moral
reading can be derived from such an admission.
Likewise, the fact that the framers plausibly intended to enact
general principles provides little support for Dworkin's strong moral
reading, even if one concedes his controversial claim that the framers'
linguistic intentions should be given weight but not their interpretive
or other intentions. The weakness in the argument emerges clearly
when one considers that the framers themselves, while arguendo intending to enact general principles, 68 were generally suspicious ofjudicial policymaking and discretion. 69 What this demonstrates is that
the mere fact that the framers meant to enact general principles provides scant support for an activist theory of constitutional adjudication
without strong additional premises which Dworkin makes no attempt
to identify or defend.
Dworkin does argue, as we have seen, 70 that the moral reading
"fits" with longstanding judicial practice. But the brief arguments he
gives for this claim support only the weaker moral reading; he offers
no argument that judges actually employ the complex and controversial interpretive strategy he recommends. Nor could such a claim
plausibly be made. As Cass Sunstein notes:
Mostjudges are not comfortable with the largest questions of political morality, and they know that they may well go wrong if they try
to decide on "the point" of constitutional guarantees. Decisions

about "the poin" are deeply contentious and exceptionally difficult.
Moreover, facts are important to constitutional judgments, and the
fact-finding capacity ofjudges is very limited. Judges know that they
may not produce social reform even when their cause is worthy and

they seek to do so. In these circumstances, it is usually-not always,
but usually-best for judges to resolve concrete cases rather than to
choose among abstract theories, and to make their decisions on the
basis of modest, low-level, relatively
particularistic principles on
71
which diverse people can converge.
67 See, e.g., BORK,supra note 22, at 166-67; ELY, supra note 43, at 12-14; WilliamJ.
Brennan, Jr., The Constitutionof the United States: ContemporaryRatification, 27 S. TEx. L.
Rv. 433, 433 (1986).
68 Elsewhere, I have argued that the framers often employed abstract language to
convey relatively specific principles of law. See BAssHAm, supra note 48, at 73-75,
81-82.
69 Id. at 3-5; ROBERT M. COvER, Jusric ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PRocEss 25-28 (1975).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
71 Sunstein, supranote 13, at 37. For a fuller statement of the argument, see CASS
R. SuNSTEmN, LEoAL REASONING AND POLrrICAL Coi-wucr 48-50 (1996).
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Sunstein here puts his finger on the two fundamental weaknesses
of Dworkin's strong moral reading: it fails both as a description of how
judges actually decide constitutional cases and as a prescription of
how they should decide such cases. In terms that Dworkin himself
employs, it neither "fits" nor "honors" 72 American constitutional
practice.
It is a striking fact about American legal practice that judges deciding concrete constitutional (or other) cases rarely engage in the
kind of abstract philosophical theorizing that Dworkin's theory recommends. One almost never encounters the kinds of appeals to
Rawls, 73 Nozick, 7 4 or other philosophical heavyweights that one would
expect ifjudges actually adhered to Dworkin's strong moral reading. 75
Rather, what one finds is a steady, workmanlike, and generally pragmatic focus on the application and incremental elaboration of rela76
tively specific principles ofjudicially crafted doctrine.
Moreover, there are sound reasons why judges are generally wise
to refrain from highly abstract theorizing about constitutional provisions. As Sunstein notes, most judges lack the time, training, or factfinding capacity to do such theorizing well. 7 7 More importantly, by

sticking to "modest, low-level, relatively particularistic" 78 principles
rather than delving into the deepest and most contentious issues of
political morality, judges are able to foster mutual respect and stability
by pursuing an "overlapping consensus" 79 among persons of fundamentally differing moral, political, and religious views. 80 Finally, as I
shall argue below,8 ' there are reasons of both principle and prudence
why judges should ordinarily exercise restraint in striking down democratic initiatives on the basis of deeply contestable applications of abstract principles.
72
73

LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 176.
SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971) (propounding a widely influential

liberal theory of justice).
74 See ROBERT NOzIcK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1973), a work widely viewed
as the most powerful contemporary defense of political libertarianism.
75 It is worth recalling in this context John Hart Ely's inimitable parody of such
an approach: "We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated." ELY,
supra note 43, at 58.
76 See BASSHAM, supra note 48, at 112-14; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 37-38.
77 Sunstein, supra note 13, at 37.
78 Id.
79 John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFoRD J. LEGiAL STUD. 1
(1987).
80 See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 37.
81 See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.

1997]

FREEDOM'S

POLITICS

1249

We turn, finally, to what Dworkin clearly views as his most important argument for the moral reading: his claim that the moral reading
is the only principled and nonarbitrary alternative to a narrow-and,
as he argues, patently indefensible-originalist approach to interpreting the Constitution.8 2 What does Dworkin mean by this claim, and
how does he seek to justify it?
Jeffrey Rosen accuses Dworkin of "artificially narrowing the field
of constitutional interpretation by presenting a Manichaean choice
between himself and Robert Bork."8 s This is misleading on two
counts. First, it is unfair to Bork, because Bork explicitly rejects all
forms of originalism that construe constitutional provisions as expressing only the specific expectations or intentions of the provisions'
framers.8 4 Further, it is unfair to Dworkin, since it is implausible to
suppose that Dworkin means to assert that his own strong moral reading is the only principled alternative to a narrow originalism. Indeed,
at various points Dworkin takes pains to distinguish his own interpretations under the moral reading from the moral reading itself,85 as
well as from other versions of the moral reading, such as Learned
Hand's restraintist version, 86 that differ in fundamental respects from
his own.
Presumably what Dworkin means to assert, then, is that "principled" constitutional theorists must choose between the weak moral
reading (understood here, as it must be, as the not-so-weak claim that
the great constitutional clauses invoke highly abstract moral principles) 87 and that form of originalism (often referred to as "strict inten82 Ronald Dworkin & Jeffrey Rosen, "Life's Dominion": An Exchange, NEW REPUBsic, Sept. 6, 1993, at 43, 43. Dworkin writes, "[c]hoice of any particular intermediate
level of abstraction would be arbitrary and unprincipled." Id.
83 Id. at 44.
84 See Boux, supra note 22, at 162-63.
85 See, e.g., FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 14, at 7-8 (noting that while he himself
favors stating the Constitution's abstract individual rights principles at the most general level possible, other constitutional theorists who also endorse the moral reading
might well favor less expansive readings).
86 Id. at 12-13.
87 It is one thing to assert that the great individual rights clauses set forth general
moral principles; it is another to say that they invoke highly abstractmoral principles.
To read the Eighth Amendment, for example, as prohibiting all forms of punishment
that violate evolving standards of decency, is to read the amendment as stating a general moral principle. To read the amendment as prohibiting all forms of punishment
that are (according to the true or ideally best moral theory) really cruel and morally
indefensible, is to read the amendment as stating a highly abstract moral principle.
Dworkin continually elides this distinction between generality and high-level abstractness, but it is important to distinguish them. Most constitutional theorists would
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tionalism")8 8 that accords binding authority to the framers' beliefs
about the specific legal implications or effects of (correctly interpreted) constitutional provisions.8 9 Understood in this way, Dworkin's disjunctive argument, if sound, provides at best only limited
support for his stronger version of the moral reading. In fact, however, as I shall argue, Dworkin's disjunction fails to support even the
weaker form of the moral reading.
There are two principal ways by which one might seek to justify
reading some or all of the Constitution's broadly stated individual
rights clauses at less than maximal levels of abstraction. The first,
which Dworkin, oddly, does not discuss, 90 is by appealing to precedent. Many of the Constitution's key individual rights provisions92
91
among them the First Amendment's free speech and free exercise
clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges or immunities
agree that the great constitutional clauses express more or less general moral principles; far fewer would agree that they express highly abstract moral principles.
88 The coinage is Paul Brest's. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 222 (1980). For similar uses, see BASSHAM, supra
note 48, at 22-23, 29-30; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONsTrruTION IN THE COURTS: LAW
OR PoIrTics 44-46 (1994). Strictly speaking, it should be noted, what many strict

intentionalists hold is that judges should apply constitutional provisions as the framers
themselves would have applied them. In other words, many strict intentionalists view as
binding not only the framers' actual specific intentions, but also their counterfactual
specific intentions, that is those "[b] eliefs about the specific legal implications or effects of (correctly interpreted) constitutional provisions that the framers would have
held if, contrary to fact, they had considered the question at issue (e.g., whether
skyjacking is an 'infamous' crime within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment Grand
Jury Indictment Clause)." BAss-Im, supra note 48, at 29. This is yet another example
of Dworkin's penchant for attributing to opponents a weaker view than the one that
they in fact hold.
89 In one place, Dworkin seems to suggest that there is, in fact, only one principled approach to interpreting the Constitution: his own. He writes: "[T]here is no
nonarbitrary way of selecting any particular level of abstraction at which a constitutional principle can be framed except the level at which the text states it." FREEDOM'S
LAW, supranote 14, at 350 n.11. This suggests that he thinks that strict intentionalism,
in the final analysis, is also an unprincipled interpretive approach.
90 Dworkin does suggest, without arguing the point, that all attempts to date to
produce a practical alternative to the moral reading have been unhelpfully vague. See
FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 14. However, as I have elsewhere argued, given the
poor track record of grand, "foundationalist" theories of constitutional interpretation, modest "pragmatic" theories may be the best we do. See BAssHAM, supranote 48,

at 109-14.
91 "Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
CONSr. amend. I, § 1.
92 "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
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96
clause, 93 the Second 9 4 and Ninth Amendments, 95 and the takings

and contract 9 7 clauses-have in fact been read by courts as articulating principles less sweeping and abstract than their language might
suggest. Dworkin gives no argument why such readings are inappropriate for these provisions, or, more specifically, why precedent may
not serve as a principled basis for an "intermediate" approach.
The second main strategy for defending a via media between abstract principles and specific intent is that adopted by "moderate intentionalists" such as Robert Bork 98 and Michael Perry.9 9 According
to this approach, what is ordinarily binding on contemporary constitutional interpreters is not the framers' specific intentions or expectations, but rather the "principles" or "directives" the framers
understood themselves to be enacting.
Moderate intentionalism enjoys two major advantages over strict
intentionalism. First, moderate intentionalism, unlike its stricter
cousin, recognizes the importance of striking a balance between the
values of predictability and stability on the one hand, and those of
flexibility and adaptability on the other. One standard objection to
originalism is that the theory is too static-that it fails to appreciate
the need for constitutional principles to have sufficient elasticity and
breadth to cope with the problems and needs of a constantly changing society. 10 0 Moderate intentionalism, by looking to the broader
purposes and more general intentions of the framers, is able to respond to this objection much more effectively than is the stricter form
of originalism.
93 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
94 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
95 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
96 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97 "No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1. For an argument chiding Dworkin for his "selective
acceptance" of noneconomic freedoms, see Richard A. Epstein, The First Freedons,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1996, § 7, at 12 (book review).
98 See Boiuc, supra note 22, at 162-67.
99 See PERRY, supra note 88, at 28-47.
100

See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14-18

(1921); Brennan, supra note 67, at 438-39; Brest, supra note 88, at 230-31; Thomas
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 712-13 (1975).
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A second and more fundamental comparative advantage of moderate intentionalism is its capacity to recognize that constitutional provisions, in principle, may signify aspirations and values that transcend
the framers' temporally bounded and often quite limited conceptions
of the scope of those provisions. It is this consideration, more than
anything else, that accounts for the shift by many conservative legal
theorists during the latter years of the Reagan administration away
from strict intentionalism toward forms of moderate intentionalism. 1° 1 It apparently became clear to such theorists that politically
unimpugnable decisions like Brown v. Board of Education could not be
supported on strict intentionalist premises, but could be plausibly defended on recognizably originalist grounds if the notion of original
intent could somehow be cut loose from the framers' concrete expectations and intentions. Moderate intentionalism, for this reason, ap-

peals to many conservatives as an attractive halfway house between two
unacceptable extremes: ajurisprudence that constitutionalizes the historically conditioned perspectives and repellent prejudices of former
generations on the one hand, and ajurisprudence of open-ended judicial policymaking on the other.
Moderate intentionalism may sound suspiciously like Dworkin's
own (weak) moral reading. There are, however, two major differences. First, Dworkin's theory attaches significantly greater weight to
constitutional precedent that cannot be squared with the framers' intent. Moderate intentionalism, like all forms of originalism, must reject at least the bulk of such decisions as illegitimate judicially
10 2
sanctioned departures from the original understanding.
Second, moderate intentionalists, as a rule, tend to be quite skeptical of arguments purporting to show that the framers intended to
constitutionalize principles so abstract that they constitute, in effect,
open-ended invitations to judicial freelancing. 103 A fair examination
of the historical record, they argue, reveals that the framers often employed abstract language to articulate principles of medium or lowlevel abstraction. More important, moderate intentionalists, qua
originalists, are committed to enforcing the original understanding
whatever historical investigation may reveal that original understanding to have been. Dworkin, by contrast, makes it clear that he favors

101

See, e.g., BoRIc, supra note 22, at 147-50; WoLFE, supra note 46, at 57; William

Bradford Reynolds, The Burger Years: A CriticalLook at the Critics' Intent, 82 Nw. U. L.

REv. 818, 821 (1988) (book review).
102 See BASSHAM, supra note 48, at 34, 97-100.
103 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 22, at 147-51.
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adherence to'original intent only in so far as it accords with his activist
10 4
moral reading.
Why is it, according to Dworkin, that attempts by moderate intentionalists to defend an intermediate strategy are bound to fail? Fundamentally, for two connected reasons. First, the fact that the framers
chose to use highly abstract language provides "very strong positive
evidence" 105 that the principles they meant to enact were equally abstract. Second, moderate intentionalists can provide no principled
reason for selecting any particular intermediate level of abstraction
because history "can never determine precisely which general principle or value it would be right to attribute" 06 to the framers.
07
The first of these arguments, as we saw above, is unsound;
there is, in fact, ample evidence that the framers often employed
broad language to convey relatively precise and delimited principles
of law. Let us turn, then, to Dworkin's second and more fundamental
argument against moderate intentionalism.
In arguing that history can never determine precisely which general principle the framers meant to enact, Dworkin is not-or not
merely-making the familiar objection that originalism is unworkable
because historical evidence regarding the framers' intentions is hopelessly spotty and inconclusive.10 8 Instead, he is arguing that even in
those cases in which the historical record is comparatively rich and
informative, it would be arbitrary to "temper the abstraction of the
very general principles the constitutional framers created out of deference to some of the framers' own convictions, though not others." 10 9
Why must such a procedure be arbitrary? Consider, Dworkin
says, the following alternative ways of stating the general principle the
framers may have understood the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to enact:
P1. No State shall engage in any act that the framers would
regard as discriminatory.
P2. No State shall engage in serious discrimination against
blacks.
104 See LAw's EMPIR, supra note 7, at 361-63; A MATTER OF PRINcipLE, supra note
47, at 54-57.
105 LiuE's DOMINION, supra note 10, at 136; ef.A MATtER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note
47, at 53.
106 FREDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 269.
107 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
108 See CHEmIuNSK', supranote 48, at 50-51; LEw, supranote 25, at 285. Daniel A.
Farber, The OliginalismDebate: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. Lj. 1085, 1087-89
(1989).
109 LnFE's DOMINION, supra note 10; at xii.
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P3. No State shall engage in serious racial discrimination.
P4. No State shall engage in any act that fails to treat persons
within its jurisdiction as equal citizens, that is, as persons entitled to
equal concern and respect. 110
Suppose we decide, after careful historical investigation, that
these are the four most likely candidates for stating the clause's originally understood meaning. How are we to choose between them? According to moderate intentionalists like Bork, judges should look to
the Constitution's "text, structure, and history"'1 11 to determine which
of the readings most faithfully reflects the lawmakers' understanding
at the time the clause was ratified. Bork himself seems to favor
(roughly) P3-the principle of racial equality-as the most likely original meaning. 1 2 He rejects P4-the highly abstract reading Dworkin
favors-as lacking any basis in the historical record of the amendment's passage, and as being inconsistent with the limited policymaking role assigned to judges in the framers' intended scheme of
1 3
separation of powers.
Dworkin argues that Bork's rejection of P4 in favor of a less abstract reading is arbitrary. What Bork fails to recognize, he avers, is
that each of the four readings is consistent with the available evidence
of the framers' intent. The four accounts should accordingly be
viewed not as "different hypotheses about the framers' mental states,
but [as] different ways of structuring the same assumptions about
what their mental states were. Each account states a genuine original
understanding, but of a different kind or at a different level, and with
I4
very different consequences.""
It is thus impossible, Dworkin argues, to discover the Fourteenth
Amendment framers' "true" intentions; it is we, rather than the framers, who perceive conflicts between the framers' concrete and abstract
convictions; and it is we who must decide, on normative political
grounds, how the framers' various expectations and convictions

110 FREEDOM'S LAW, supranote 14, at 295; see also LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 10,
at 139-40. I have paraphrased Dworkin's formulations of these alternative readings.
111 BORK, supra note 22, at 162.
112 Id. at 329-30. I say "roughly" because Bork may in a fact endorse a somewhat
more complex view-one that acknowledges that the clause's original meaning does

extend to a limited extent beyond simply race and ethnicity. See id. at 144-45, 149-50,
329-30 for Bork's rather opaque discussion of the relevant issues.
113 Id. at 176-77, 329.
114 FREEDOM's LAW, supra note 14, at 296; cf. A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note
47, at 49-51; Lllm's

DOMINION,

supra note 10, at 139-40.
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should figure in our understanding of the clause's contemporary legal
115
effects.
Bork, as we've seen, denies that Dworkin's highly abstract reading, P4, states a genuine original understanding of the framers. His
main ground for excluding P4 is that the framers, in explaining and
debating the clause, spoke only about issues of racial discrimination
and racial equality; there is no evidence, he says, apart from the broad
language of the clause itself, that the framers intended to enact a principle that would have any bearing whatever on matters such as gender
equality or homosexual rights. Bork, in other words, uses evidence of
the framers' specific intentions (inter alia) to identify the general
principle they most plausibly intended to constitutionalize, while insisting that it is the principle, not the specific intent, that is legally
binding. But this, Dworkin argues, is like wanting to have one's cake
and eat it too. For once we abandon the strict intentionalist strategy
of limiting the force of constitutional provisions to their authors' specific convictions, there is simply not enough historical evidence left,
he argues, to warrant. selecting any particular level of abstraction except the level at which the text states it. Moderate intentionalists, like
Bork, thus find themselves "in a kind of free fall in which the original
understanding can be anything, and the only check on [their] judg6
ment is [their] own political instincts.""1
Dworkin's critique of moderate intentionalism fails for several
reasons. First, it is doubtful that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did collectively intend to enact all four of the principles
Dworkin discusses. (It is difficult enough imagining them agreeing on
any one reading,.much less the four rather obviously conflicting principles he identifies.) It is especially doubtful that the framers intended to constitutionalize the highly abstract principle Dworkin
favors. The only evidence Dworkin cites that they did-the abstract
language of the clause-is, as we have seen, far from conclusive given
(a) the frequency with which the framers used abstract language to
convey relatively specific principles, (b) the complete absence in the
historical record of any statements indicating support for such an expansive and open-ended reading, and (c) the framers' well-documented suspicion of judicial discretion and policymaking.
Second, even if Dworkin is right in his view of the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, it is implausible to think that
a similar pattern holds for most other broadly stated individual rights
provisions as well. A situation in which the framers simultaneously
115
116
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LAw, supra note 14, at 296; Lim's
supra note 14, at 300.
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held multiple layers of conflicting intentions, ranging from the highly
specific to the highly abstract, is bound to be unusual. Indeed, we
have already noted a number of cases in which the framers pretty
clearly intended to constitutionalize a principle less abstract than the
11 7
language alone might suggest.
Further, Dworkin's argument rests on a mistaken assumption
about the role specific intentions can properly play in the constitutional theories of moderate intentionalists such as Bork. He correctly
notes that what such theorists regard as binding are the general principles the framers intended to enact, not their individual or collective
views about the correct application of those principles to specific
cases. Thus, for example, for most moderate intentionalists, it is irrelevant that the authors of the Equal Protection Clause apparently believed that the provision did not prohibit racially segregated
schooling; what matters is that they enacted a principle which, correctly understood, bars such discriminatory treatment. Citing examples such as this, Dworkin argues that moderate intentionalists may
make no use at all of specific intentions in their search for the general
principles the framers understood themselves to be enacting. And
once such information is excluded, he claims, there is no longer
enough historical evidence remaining to warrant any conclusion
about the original understanding other than that the framers intended to enact principles just as abstract as the language they chose
to employ.
It is a mistake, however, to suppose that moderate intentionalists
must regard the framers' specific intentions as having little or no evidentiary value. In some instances, to be sure, this will be the case.
This is certainly true of the specific intent to which Dworkin repeatedly adverts: that the Equal Protection Clause, as originally understood, did not prohibit racially segregated public education. Such an
original understanding might be taken as evidence that the framers
understood the clause to enact a quite narrow principle-the principle, for example, that States may not discriminate on the basis of race
with respect to the limited civil rights enumerated in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.118 At least as plausibly, however, it could be viewed, as
both Dworkin and Bork suggest, as evidence that the framers misunderstood the force of their own intended principle, by failing to see
segregated public education as the form of serious racial discrimination that it in fact is.
117 See supra notes 54, 68, 91-97 and accompanying text.
118 This originalist reading is favored by Raoul Berger. See BERGER, supra note 23,
at 22-36.
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In other cases, however, specific intentions may be of significant
value in determining the framers' more general intentions. The fact,
for example, that many influential congressional supporters of the
Fourteenth Amendment stressed that the amendment was not intended to guarantee equal political rights for blacks 1 9 is weighty evidence that, pace Dworkin, no broad principle of "equal citizenship"
was intended. Likewise, evidence of the framers' specific intent with
respect to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses
makes it clear that neither clause was originally understood as imposing substantive limitations on legislative action. 20 Again, the fact that
the founders apparently saw nothing unconstitutional about paying
religious missionaries to teach the Indians is strong evidence that the
framers did not intend in the Establishment Clause to enact a broad
2
prohibition on all government aid to religion.' '
In short, Dworkin is wrong to suggest that moderate intentionalists can make no significant use of evidence of the framers' specific
intentions in searching for the general principles they presume the
framers meant to enact. Such evidence is often helpful, and it often
points to readings much less abstract than those presupposed in
Dworkin's strong moral reading. Consequently, there is nothing inherently "unprincipled" about the moderate intentionalist's quest for
a middle ground between strict intentions and Dworkin's open-ended
abstractions. The real arbitrariness, it would seem, lies in attributing
to the framers abstract intentions across the board, while ignoring
clear evidence that their true intentions may in many cases have been
relatively specific.
In summary, then, none of Dworkin's four main arguments provides cogent support for his strong moral reading. So weak are the
arguments, in fact, that one can only speculate, as Cass Sunstein does
in a recent book review, about the true ground of Dworkin's activist
agenda. "In the end," Sunstein suggests, "Dworkin's argument for judicial guardianship is rooted in the simple, quasi-empirical claim that,
all things considered, judges thinking in abstract terms are more likely
than anyone else to make good judgments about the rights that Americans actually have.' I 22 Quite so. But Dworkin doesn't make that argument; at most he occasionally gestures in its direction. To be
119 See id. at 52-58.
120 See id. at 193-214.
121 See Robert L. Cord, Interpretingthe Establishment Clause of the FirstAmendment: A
"Non-Absolute Separationist"Approach, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 731,
737-38 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 683, 695 (1990).

122 Sunstein, supra note 13, at 37.

1258

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72:4

convincing, Dworkin needs to descend from the philosophical empyrean he normally inhabits and make the lengthy, messy, "quasi-empirical" case that Americans really are better off under a regime of
judicial philosopher-kings. He also, of course, needs to confront the
familiar conservative retort that Americans have a collective right-a
right of democratic self-govemance-not to be governed in such a
fashion, even on the supposition that it is for their own good. 1 23
Dworkin makes no serious attempt to address the first challenge; he
does, to his credit, squarely confront the second. It is to that response
that we now turn.
III.

Is

THE

MORAL

A.

READING UNDEMOCRATIC?

Dworkin's Argument

The most serious objection to the moral reading, as Dworkin acknowledges, is that it is undemocratic. "[W] hatever the explanation,
and granting the qualifications, rule in accord with the consent of a
majority of those governed is the core of the American governmental
system."1 24 Yet the moral reading permits-indeed, in many cases, requires-a small cadre of unelected, life-tenured judges to strike down
acts supported by popular majorities by invoking abstract constitutional language "about whose actual meaning reasonable and reasonably trained people violently disagree." 125 The conflict could scarcely
appear clearer: "Democracy means rule by the people and this," Dwor126
kin concedes, "seems to be rule by the judges instead."
The standard liberal response to this familiar dilemma is to acknowledge the conflict between democratic principles and judicial activism but insist that protecting basic individual rights is more
important than majority rule. 12 7 Dworkin's response is boldly different. He argues that the essence of democracy is equal citizenship, not
majority rule. And because judicial review premised on the moral
reading (if rightly conducted) is an effective means of protecting and
promoting equal citizenship, such a reading is not only consistent with
democracy, but may in fact serve to advance it.
123

For a classic expression of this response, see

HAND,

supranote 36, at 73-74; see

also Sunstein, supra note 13, at 37.
124 ELY, supra note 43, at 7.
125 Equality, Democracy, and Constitution, supra note 5, at 325.
126 Id.
127

See, e.g.,

DAVID

RiCHARDS, THE MORAL

nan, supra note 67, at 436-37.

CRrIcISM OF LAW

50-51 (1977); Bren-
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Dworkin's strategy is similar to that employed byJohn Hart Ely in
his classic work, Democracy and Distrust.128 In that work, Ely argues convincingly thatjudicial decisions may be "counter-majoritarian" without
necessarily being antidemocratic. Modern Supreme Court decisions,
for example, striking down restrictive voter qualification laws 12 9 and
correcting legislative malapportionment 130 have enhanced, rather
than thwarted, representative democracy by broadening and clearing
the channels of political participation.' 3 ' Likewise, Ely argues, vigorous judicial enforcement of constitutional guarantees of free speech
and equal protection of the laws has strengthened American democracy by encouraging open political debate and by facilitating the effective representation of minorities. 3 2 Where Ely errs, Dworkin suggests,
is in arguing that courts must limit themselves to this purely processoriented "representation-reinforcing" mode of judicial review. Because Ely assumes, falsely, that majoritarianism is at the core of the
American system of government, he concludes that any "substantive"
judicial review must be both undemocratic and illegitimate. Once we
understand, however, that equality, not majority rule, is the essence of
democracy, then Ely's strategy can be extended to include a great
many other individual rights guarantees that bear directly or indirectly on a citizen's fundamental right to be treated with equal concern and respect.
B.

Capsule Statement of the Argument

Dworkin's argument for this claim is lengthy and extremely
dense. It may be helpful, therefore, if we state the argument briefly
before examining it in detail. The central argument is this:
We can distinguish two leading conceptions of democracy: a
majoritarian conception and a constitutional conception. The
majoritarian conception sees the essence of democracy as lying in majority rule. It presupposes, moreover, a statistical understanding of
collective political action; it assumes, that is, that group political actions and decisions are simply a function of what individual members
of the group do or decide. The constitutional conception, by contrast, rejects majoritarianism. It sees equal citizenship, not majority
ELY, supra note 43.
129 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state poll taxes); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down Texas'

128

"private" white primary).

130 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
131 See ELY, supra note 43, at 116-25.
132 Id. at 105-16, 135-62.
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rule, as the central defining aim of democracy. Moreover, the constitutional conception rests on a communal, rather than a statistical, understanding of collective political action; it claims that in a genuine
democracy political decisions are made by a distinct collective entitythe people as such-rather than by any set of individual citizens or
officials considered one by one. The majoritarian conception has
long been the dominant view of American democracy. American constitutional theory, in particular, with its endless preoccupation with
the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" of reconciling judicial review with
the nation's underlying democratic values, has long been in the grip
of the majoritarian conception. But the majoritarian conception is
seriously flawed. None of the supposedly most powerful arguments
offered in defense of the majoritarian conception-that majority rule
is required by the values of popular sovereignty, political equality, and
community, respectively-provide adequate support for the conception. Hence, the majoritarian conception should be rejected in favor
of the constitutional one. And once we have done so, a persuasive
case can be made that judicial review in the spirit of the moral reading, far from compromising democracy, may serve to preserve and enhance it.

C.

DetailedExposition of the Argument

To begin our detailed examination of the argument: Dworkin
notes that there is no agreed definition of democracy. 13 3 There is, to
be sure, general agreement about the abstract "concept" of democracy: democracy means government by the people. But political theorists differ deeply about the best "conception" of democracy-about
34
what government by the people, more concretely, really involves.1
In American constitutional theory, one conception of democracy has
long held virtually unchallenged sway: the majoritarian conception.
On this view, a government is democratic to the extent that it embodies the principle of majority rule.
Many who endorse the majoritarian conception also endorse a
widely accepted normative principle that Dworkin calls the
majoritarian premise.1 35 This asserts "that political procedures should
133 For an older but still useful collection of readings on the problem of defining
democracy, see DEMOCRACY: THE CoNTEMPORARY THEORIES (M. Rejai ed., 1967).
134 See FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 15.
135 Dworkin asserts that theorists who endorse the majoritarian conception also
accept the majoritarian premise. Ia at 20. This is surely too strong. Many people
believe that the core of democracy is majority rule without believing that majority rule
should always, or nearly always, prevail.
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be designed so that, at least on important matters, the decision that is
reached is the decision that a majority or plurality of citizens favors, or
would favor if it had adequate information and enough time for reflection." 13 6 In the United States, as Dworkin notes, the majoritarian
premise is generally held in a qualified form: it is not widely thought
that majority should always prevail over minority rights. However it is
widely believed, he contends, that it is always unfair whenever the
"political majority is not allowed to have its way, so that even when
there are strong enough countervailing reasons to justify this, the un37
fairness remains."
Majoritarians, Dworkin claims, tend to think of collective political
action in purely statistical terms. Group action is statistical "when
what the group does is only a matter of some function, rough or specific, of what the individual members of the group do on their own,
that is, with no sense of doing something as a group."' 38 On this view,
democracy-government "by the people"-is simply a matter of
counting individual votes and aggregating individual preferences.
Dworkin argues for a "communal," rather than a statistical, reading of government "by the people." Collective action is communal
"when it cannot be reduced just to some statistical function of individual action, when it presupposes a special, distinct, collective
agency." 3 9 When we say, for example, that an orchestra or a football
team played well, we're saying something about the group as a whole
that cannot be adequately reduced to a statistical readout of individual performances. Likewise, in a genuine democracy, Dworkin argues, "political decisions are taken by a distinct entity-the people as
40
such-rather than by any set of individuals one by one."'
Dworkin next considers the soundness of the majoritarian premise. Why should we think that a moral cost is necessarily paid whenever constitutional limitations prevent a political majority from having
its own way? Dworkin considers, and rejects, three standard responses.
First, it is commonly argued that constitutional restrictions on
majority rule are inconsistent with popular sovereignty or collective
self-rule, The moral cost of such restrictions, on this view, is the loss
of a fundamental political liberty: the liberty of people to govern
themselves.
136 Id at 15-16 (emphasis added).
137
138
139
140

Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
IM at 20.
Id,
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However, the notion of collective self-government makes no
sense understood statistically, Dworkin argues. Considered one by
one, individuals in a large democracy have so little control over collective decisions that "constitutional restraints cannot be thought to di141
minish it enough to count as objectionable for that reason."
Moreover, for familiar reasons, many individuals' liberty may be enhanced by constitutional constraints on majority power. The notion
of collective self-rule is intelligible, therefore, only if it is understood
communally. But such a realization is ultimately inconsistent with the
majoritarian premise. For only if I am an equal and full-fledged moral
member of the political community is an act of the community in a
pertinent sense my act, even when I may have argued and voted
against it.142 In this way, reflection on the conditions of democratic
self-government leads us to reflect on the conditions of genuine moral
membership in a political community. And this, in turn, prompts us
to abandon the majoritarian conception of democracy in favor of a
more attractive conception that we shall examine shortly.
A second standard argument for majority rule appeals to the
value of political equality. Majority rule, it is claimed, is a fair procedure for making collective decisions, since it gives each person an
equal vote in decisions that may affect his life. On this view, then, the
moral cost of imposing constitutional limits on majority rule is a loss
of political fairness or equality.
But how exactly should we understand "political equality" in this
argument? On the statistical reading, political equality might be understood as either equality of political power or as equality of political
status. The first-equality of power-is neither desirable nor achievable in a representative democracy; few would deny, for example, that
elected and appointed officials rightly exercise greater political power
than ordinary citizens. And the second-equality of status-is not infringed by constitutional constraints on majority will, since mere possession of political authority-even electorally unaccountable political
authority, such as that wielded by the Supreme Court-carries no presupposition that some citizens are "worthier or better fit to participate
1 43
in collective decisions than others."
Finally, some theorists have recently sought to defend majority
rule by invoking the value of community. On this view, what gets lost
when majority will is overridden is the "stimulus" of participating in a
141
142
143

Id.at 21.
See id. at 22.
I& at 28.
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great "common venture:" 4 4 the venture of living in a genuinely deliberative democracy in which, ideally, public-spirited citizens improve
both the quality of collective decisionmaking and their own characters
byjoining in the public arena to debate issues of importamce to all.145
This argument fails, according to Dworkin, because it "assumes,
with no pertinent evidence, that the only or most beneficial kind of
'participation' in politics is the kind that looks toward elections of representatives who will then enact legislation." 146 On the contrary, he
argues, public discussion of constitutional issues may often be better,
more genuinely deliberative, if such issues are left for courts to decide. Owing to their insulation from ordinary majoritarian politics,
courts have a capacity, in Alexander Bickel's oft-quoted words, "to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may
have been forgotten in the moment's hue and cry." 147 Participants in
ordinary politics, by contrast, all too often lose sight of such enduring
values and fundamental principles in the heat of electioneering and
the give and take of legislative compromise. 148 A deeper, more ethical, more deliberative community may be fostered, therefore, by rejecting the majoritarian conception in favor of an alternative that
Dworkin calls the constitutional conception of democracy.
On the constitutional conception, democracy is essentially a matter of equal citizenship, not majority rule. The constitutional concepdion, moreover, presupposes a communal rather than a statistical
reading of government "by the people." It claims, that is, that in a
genuine democracy, political decisions are made by a special, distinct
agency, "the people" acting as a collective and mutually responsible
whole. Such collective action and responsibility is possible, Dworkin
argues, only if certain "democratic conditions" of "moral membership" are met. The most important of these conditions are that each
member of the political community be given "a part in any collective
decision, a stake it in it, and independence from it."' 49
144
145
ment
"civic

HArm,supra note 36, at 73-74.
Characteristically, Dworkin cites no authors who actually advance this argufor majority rule. But the reference is clearly to theorists who belong to the
republican" tradition of American thought. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Governmen, 100 HAav. L. REv. 4
(1986). For helpful background on civic republicanism, see Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988).

146

FREEDOM'S LAW,

147
148
149

BICKEL, supra note 42, at 26.
See FREEDOM'S LAxW, supra note 14, at 30-31, 344-45.
Id at 24.

supra note 14, at 31.
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First, moral membership in a democratic community requires
that "each person must have an opportunity to make a difference in
the collective decisions [of the community], and the force of his
role-the magnitude of the difference he can make-must not be
structurally fixed or limited in ways that reflect assumptions about his
worth or talent or ability, or the soundness of his convictions or
tastes."1 50
In practical terms, this principle of participation requires universal or near universal suffrage, frequent free and fair elections, freedom of speech and dissent, and at least general observance of the
principle of one person, one vote. I5'
Second, moral membership in a democracy requires that each
person be given an equal stake in the community by being treated as
equally worthy of respect and concern. The intuition underlying this
condition is that a political community in which a majority treats a
minority with contempt is not only unjust but undemocratic as well.15 2
As Dworkin realizes, however, many people share an intuition that
cuts strongly the other way: that not all democracies are, by definition,
ideally just and fair. To avoid this consequence, Dworkin qualifies the
principle of stake so that it requires only that political officials act on
some bona fide conception of equal treatment, not necessarily on the
5
best or right conception. 3
Finally, Dworkin argues that in a genuine democracy government
must respect the moral independence of its citizens. Government
must not attempt to "dictate what its citizens think about matters of
political or moral or ethical judgment, but must, on the contrary, provide circumstances that encourage citizens to arrive at beliefs on these
matters through their own reflective and finally individual conviction." 154 This is required, he claims, because a genuine political community exists only when each of its members can, with full self-respect,
regard himself as a partner in ajoint venture. It would be absurd, for
example, to regard German Jews as authentic members of the Nazi-led
political community that sought to destroy them. In the same way,
Dworkin argues, any political community that denies some or all of its
citizens' capacity to judge for themselves with respect to the core val150 Id
151 Significantly, Dworkin would permit certain "non-invidious" departures from
the principle, including, in some circumstances, special voting districts for disadvantaged groups. See Equality, Democracy, and Constitution, supra note 5, at 338.
152 See FREEDOM'S LAW,supra note 14, at 25.
153 Id. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Equality, Democracy, and
Constitution, supra note 5, at 339.
154 FREEDOM'S LAW,supra note 14, at 26.
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ues of their lives undermines the political bases of self-respect, and
consequently undermines community itself. Only those forms of government, therefore, which embrace some form of liberal tolerance of
unpopular sexual and personal morality are fully democratic. 55
In short, genuine democracy is fundamentally a matter of equal
citizenship, that is, equal moral membership in a political community
that respects the principles of participation, stake, and moral independence. And once we understand this, Dworkin says, we can see "that
the moral reading of a political constitution is not antidemocratic but,
on the contrary, is practically indispensable to democracy." 56 For
only if independent judges (or other political officials) are empowered to enforce strong constitutional limitations on majority will are
the conditions of moral membership likely to be effectively maintained. In the American governmental system this responsibility rests
ultimately with the justices of the Supreme Court. The justices are
not, of course, electorally accountable. But this does not mean that
their decisions are eo ipso undemocratic. Court decisions that preserve
and strengthen equal citizenship are democratic; those that compromise equal citizenship are not. Thus, Ely was right to claim that vigorous judicial protection of free speech and political equality-however
politically unpopular-is consistent with democracy. He was wrong,
however, to suppose that judicial review outside these limited areas is
necessarily undemocratic and illegitimate. Courts promote equal citizenship-and hence strengthen democracy-when they enforce constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, freedom from
government establishment of religion, equal protection, and fair criminal procedures. 5 7 They weaken equal citizenship and democracy
when they uphold laws making consensual homosexual sodomy a
crime,' 58 or strike down reasonable limits on campaign expenditures
by wealthy individuals.' 5 9 And, most controversially, judges promote
genuine democracy when they strike down laws criminalizing abortion 60 and assisted suicide,' 6 ' since such laws violate the conditions of
155

156
157

Id.; see also Equality, Democracy, and Constitution, supra note 5, at 341.
FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 7.
See Equality, Democracy, and Constitution, supra note 5, at 343.
See FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 388-89 n.4 (critiquing Bowers v. Hardwick,

158
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
159 See id., at 18 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), striking down expenditure limitations imposed by the
Campaign Finance Act of 1974 as violative of freedom of speech).
160 See id. at 109-10; see also LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 10, at 148-68.
161

See

FREEDoM's

note 10, at 213-17.

LAW, supra note 14, at 145-46; see also LaE'S DOMINION, supra
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moral independence and equal status that make true democratic selfgovernment possible.
The moral reading, on Dworkin's view, provides judges with the
interpretive tools and constitutional mandate they need to effectively
protect the integral democratic conditions of participation, stake, and
moral independence from hostile or overreaching majorities. Such a
reading, consequently, is not antidemocratic. On the contrary, it is,
for Dworkin, virtually a precondition of genuine democracy under the
62
circumstances of modern political life.'
D. Does the Moral Reading Really Promote Democracy?
Dworkin's defense of the democratic legitimacy of the moral
reading is characteristically thought-provoking and subtly argued, but
ultimately, I argue, a failure. The argument fails because it rests on a
false choice between the two conceptions of democracy Dworkin
discusses.
Dworkin's so-called "constitutional"' 6 3 conception of democracy
is clearly attractive in many respects. It embraces many of the conditions widely associated with liberal democracy: periodic free elections,
a significant degree of popular control of policymakers, political
equality, and respect for basic civil liberties and minority rights. It
rests, as well, on a conception of social solidarity and moral community that resonates deeply with enduring American ideals of equal citizenship and liberty and justice for all. By contrast, the majoritarian
conception can easily seem menacing and atomistic: it conjures up
images of a tyranny of the majority, and of isolated individuals acting
with little sense of shared purpose or responsibility. If the only choice
were between these two versions of democracy, a strong case could
doubtless be made for preferring the first.
162 See FREEDOM'S LAW,supranote 14, at 7; LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 10, at 123.
Dworkin, it should be noted, does not claim that democracy is possible only when
independent judges are empowered to enforce constitutional constraints on majority
will. He admits that other, perhaps equally effective institutional arrangements are
possible. Rather, his view is: (a) that it is essential to genuine democracy that government treat its citizens equally and respect their basic liberties and dignity; (b) that it is
"practically indispensable" to genuine democracy that there be broad constitutional
guarantees of individual rights; and (c) that it is consistent with (and in fact supportive of) democracy to have those guarantees enforced by electorally unaccountable
judges. See FREEDOM's LAW, supra note 14, at 7, 33-35.
163 The name is clearly misleading. There are many "constitutional" conceptions
of democracy, just as there are many "moral readings" of the American Constitution.
The labels are inapposite because of their false suggestion of uniqueness.
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In fact, however, the choice Dworkin poses is a false one. First,
there is no reason to think we must choose between a purely statistical
conception of democracy and a purely communal one. On any plausible theory of democracy, I shall argue, collective political actions will
sometimes rightly be viewed as statistical and sometimes as communal.
Second, it is misleading to suggest that broadly majoritarian conceptions of democracy must claim that all deviations from strict majority
rule are unfair or involve some other significant moral cost. There
are, in fact, plausible and attractive conceptions of democracy which
maintain that popular control of policymakers by political majorities is
a core value of democracy; that this value is inconsistent with the kind
of expansive judicial activism envisioned in Dworkin's strong moral
reading; but that departures from majority rule may sometimes bejustified, without high moral cost, for a host of both pragmatic and moral
reasons.
First, it is false to think that we must choose between an exclusively statistical conception of democratic collective action and an exclusively communal one. The notion of communal collective action,
as Dworkin notes, 6 4 can easily seem mysterious; some critics, indeed,
have denied that there can be genuinely communal collective action,
that is, collective action which is logically irreducible to the actions of
individual members of the group. 165 But Dworkin is correct to insist
that there are clear cases of communal collective action. 16 6 Teams
can lose football games; individual players, strictly speaking, cannot
Business corporations can merge with other corporations or form cartels; individual members of those corporations can not. And a badly
matched barbershop quartet can sing poorly, even if each individual
in the quartet sings well.
What is true of teams, business corporations, and groups is also
true of nations. An individual citizen of West Germany, for example,
cannot reunite with East Germany; only the West German people as a
collective whole can do that. On the other hand, we do often speak of
164
165

See FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 20.
See, e.g., J.W.N. Watkins, Ideal Types and HistoricalExplanation, in READINGS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 729-30 (H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck eds., 1953); S.I. BENN &
R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLmcAL THoUGHT 276 (1959) ("Acts attributed to
associations are, in the end, the acts of those 'in authority'-acts of individuals duly
authorized by rules; and the identity and 'life' of an association is to be found in its
rules, and not in any spirit or super-personality above its particular members."). For a
valuable discussion of the relevant issues, see W.H. Dray, Holism and Individualism in
History and Social Science, 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 53 (Paul Edwards ed.,

1967).
166 See generallyPETER A.
(1984).
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nations in ways that are straightforwardly statistical. Someone who
says, for example, that "Frisians are thrifty" is not saying that there
exists a collective entity, the Frisian people, which habitually exemplifies thriftiness. He is saying, simply, that most Frisians are thrifty.
Likewise, to say that "The American people voted overwhelmingly for
change" is not to say anything about the American people as a collective agent. It is simply to say something about a statistical collectivity,
namely, a substantial majority of Americans.
The point is a general one about collective agency. Collective action in baseball can be either statistical ("The team is hitting .282") or
communal ("This win was a team effort"). The same is true of business corporations, groups, clubs, churches1 6 7-and nations. Both statistical and communal modes of understanding and expression are
appropriate, in various contexts, for each of these forms of collective
agency. And this is true, pace Dworkin, largely independently of any
conditions of "moral membership." Churches can baptize, universities
can confer honorary degrees, and states can join federations-all examples of communal collective action-even if some members of
these collectivities are not treated as fully equal participants or
stakeholders.
Moreover, Dworkin's particular way of viewing communal democratic action raises serious moral issues. On his communal conception, acts of my democratic government are also, morally speaking, my
acts, for which I bear some measure of responsibility. Dworkin does
not specify the sense of "responsibility" he thinks is at issue here; but
his reference to collective German responsibility for Nazi war crimes
suggests that it must be a sense strong enough to justify feelings of
collective shame and guilt, as well as, perhaps, a collective moral obligation to make reparations to victims of these crimes. The worry, of
course, is that all of this can easily lapse into a sort of tribalism or
"organicism" in which personal moral fault or liability is imputed for
acts that an individual neither caused nor intended, and may in fact
have done all in her power to prevent. 68 Surely it is nothing but a bit
of Rousseau-like mystification to suggest, for example, that Roe v. Wade
167 For instance, to say that "Peter was baptized into the Church" is to speak of the
Church in a communal sense. To say that "The Church is divided about the issue of
married priests" is to speak statistically.
168 For classic critiques of "tribalist" ascriptions of responsibility, see 1 KARL R.
POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 169-83 (5th ed. 1966); H.D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility, 23 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1948). For a careful attempt to think through the
(very limited) conditions under which ascriptions of collective responsibility are morally justified, see JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 222-51 (1970).
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was literally or morally an act of the American people, for which even
its most ardent and active opponents bear responsibility. At some
level, it must be possible for citizens to disassociate themselves from
the evils that others do; self-respect demands that the walls of integrity
not be as permeable as Dworkin's view seems to imply.169
There are, further, two additional respects in which Dworkin
poses a false choice between majoritarian and constitutional conceptions of democracy. Broadly majoritarian views of democracy need
not-and ought not-claim that majority rule is the "essence" of democracy. And such theories need not-and perhaps ought notclaim that a significant moral cost is necessarily incurred whenever
political majorities are not allowed to have their way.
There are, as Dworkin emphasizes, many competing conceptions
of democracy. 170 For the ancient Greeks, who coined the term, democracy seems primarily to have meant direct rule by the demos, the
poor or plebeian class. 171 Marxist-Leninists, somewhat analogously,
commonly define "true" democracy as rule by or for the proletariat or
oppressed. 72 For democratic socialists, genuine democracy is "a system of governance that represents in both form and content the needs
and desires of the ruled" 7 3 : a system, that is, in which people enjoy
not only democratic political freedoms, but freedom from want and
economic exploitation as well. Other theorists (advocates of "direct"
or "participatory" democracy) insist that authentic democracy exists
only in systems that encourage direct, face-to-face citizen participation
169 Perhaps Dworkin means only to impute a kind of "metaphysical" rather than
moral guilt to otherwise innocent "participants" in collective wrongs. For an attempt
to make sense of such a distinction, see Larry May, Metaphysical Guilt and Moral Taint,
in CoLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILIY. FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED
ETHICS 239 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991).
170 Forty years ago, one democratic theorist estimated that there were some 200
definitions of "democracy." See MASsimo SALVADoRi, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 20 (1957).
The number is doubtless much larger today.
171 See Stanley I. Benn, Democracy, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 338 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE Lim AND TmIES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
9-10 (1977); Richard Wollheim, A Paradoxin the Theory of Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY,
POLTICS,AND SocETY, 2d Series 71, 72 (Peter Laslett & W.G. Rundman eds., 1962).
But see ROBERT A. DAr, DEMOCRACY AND ITS Crics 13-23 (1989) (arguing that the
Greeks conceived of democracy as direct rule by the entire citizen-body, not just the

poor).
172 See, e.g., VA. MALININ ET AL., THE FuNDAmENTALS OF MARXST-LENRNST PHmIosoPHY 423 (Robert Daglish trans., 1974); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 36 (1966).
173 MICHAEL PARENTI, DEMocRAcY FOR THE FEw 57 (4th ed. 1983); cf.EDwARD S.
GREENBERG,

1986).

THE AMEmicAN PoOCAL SYsTEM: A RADICAL

APPROACH

341-50 (4th ed.
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in community decisionmaking. 174 Still others ("pluralists") see democracy, in actual practice, as fundamentally a process in which pluralist elites contend for political power by periodically competing for
the approval of voters. 175 Still others (advocates of "liberal" or "constitutional" democracy) view democracy as a form of government in
which political majorities (or, more generally, their freely elected representatives) govern within a framework of constitutional constraints
designed to ensure the effective enjoyment of basic political (and perhaps other) rights of individuals and minorities. 17 6 And the list could
easily be extended.
Given these wide variations in contemporary and historical usage,
why should we suppose that there is any unitary "essence" that all
forms of democracy (correctly so-called) share? Why not say, rather,
that "democracy" is used in a variety of senses, that it correctly refers
to a variety of different political systems (unified, at best, by a kind of
"family resemblance"),177 and that some of these systems are morally
more defensible and attractive than others? 7 8
By insisting that there is a single true "essence" of democracy,
Dworkin in effect claims to have achieved a uniquely superior insight
into the "true nature" of democracy: other constitutional and political
theorists, together with ordinary citizens, 7 9 are still hopelessly
174

See, e.g.,

BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY. PARTICIPATORY

POLITICS FOR A

NEW AGE (1984); CAROL PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970).

175 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPrIALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269
(1942); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, 63-151 (1956). See generaly WIL.LAM ALTON KELso, AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THEo-RY. PLURALISM AND ITS CRT-

ICs (1978).
176 See, e.g., CAI.J. FRIEDRICH, CONsTrrTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 5-6
(1950);JEssE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLMCAL PROCESS 5-10
(1980); RAWLS, supra note 73, at 221-34.
177 As Wittgenstein points out, we sometimes use general terms to refer to things
which, though evidently related, have no nontrivial set of properties in common. For
instance, it is impossible, he says, to identify any set of common properties shared by
all things we call "games." But "games" is not therefore simply multivocal: those
things we call "games" do bear a kind of "family resemblance" to another, that is, a
complicated network of properties that overlap and criss-cross in various ways. See
LUDWIG WrIrrGENsEIN, PHILISOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-67 (1958). My suggestion is that something similar may be true of "democracy."
178 For a similar view of "democracy," see WILLIAM N. NELSON, ON JUSTirING DE_MOCRACY 3 (1980); cf. DAHL, supra note 175, at 1 ("there is no democratic theorythere are only democratic theories").
179 Imagine Dworkin walking into a New England town meeting and saying: "The
problem with this proceeding is that it is not nearly democratic enough. To make it
truly democratic, you should appoint, for life, a small number of citizens who possess
an absolute veto over decisions that, in their view, violate the fundamental liberties,
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trapped in the Platonic cave of ignorance and illusion. Dworkin is
free to make such a claim if he wishes: but he should not foist bad
arguments on his opponents. Some democratic theorists do claim
that majority rule is an essential feature of democracy. 8 0 Many others
do not. 18 1 What cannot be denied, however, is that majority rule is a
core value of democracy as "democracy' has standardly been understood in the American political and constitutional tradition.
It is a commonplace that the American democracy does not embrace simple majoritarianism. The American governmental system is
a "limited" or "constitutional" democracy that features numerous constitutional' 82-as well as extra-constitutionalI8 3-checks on majority
84
power. At the same time, most Americans regard it as "axiomatic"
that governmental policymaking should be subject to control by persons accountable to electoral majorities. This principle, which
Michael Perry labels the "principle of electorally accountable policymaking,"' 8 5 is rightly seen as lying at the heart of the American system of government. 8 6 As Perry notes, the word "democracy is so
freighted and misused"'8 7 that it often obscures more than it illuminates the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review. The fundamental issue of constitutional law is not whether judicial review is
compatible with democracy. It is, rather, the extent to which constitudignity, or equality of the town's citizens. Now that would be really democratic." It is
instructive, I think, to imagine the reaction.
180 See e.g.,JAvEs BRYCE, 1 MODERN DEMocRAcIEs 22 (1921); E.F. CARrrr, ETmICAL
AND POLITICAL THINKING 150 (1957). See generally DAnL, supra note 175, at 35-36.
181 See, e.g., BENN & PETERS, supra note 165, at 397-98; CHOPER, supra note 176, at
7; CARL COHEN, DEMOCRACY 61-66 (1971); DAHL, supra note 171, at 110, 135-52; J.
ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC PoLTICAL THEORY 7-8 (1979).

182 Some notable examples include: constitutional protections of individual rights,
the electoral college, the Presidential veto, the allotment of two senators per state, a
difficult and elaborate constitutional amendment procedure, and lifetime appointment of federal judges.
183 See generally CHOPER, supra note 176, at 8-9, 12-25 (discussing extraconstitutional devices, such as Senate filibusters and the prerogatives of congressional committee chairs, that frequently operate to block actions favored by legislative or
popular majorities).
184 MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 10
(1982).
185 Id. at 9.
186 ELY, supra note 43, at 7; see also BICEEL, supranote 42, at 16-18; CHOPER, supra
note 176, at 10-11; HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATmC THEORY 61
(1960) ("the principle universally regarded as indispensable in modem democracies
is that of choosing the policy-makers (representatives) at elections held at more or
less regular intervals").
187 PERRY, supra note 184, at 4.
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tional policymaking by the judiciary is and ought to be consistent with
the principle of electorally accountable policymaking.
Elsewhere Dworkin has argued that "[t] he real threat a constitution poses to democracy . . . has nothing to do with the fact that
judges are not elected."1 8 He points out that:
[w] e do not think it seriously undemocratic that other powerful officials are not elected. Secretaries of State or Defense or Treasury are
not elected, and they can do more damage in a week than any single judge can in his or her judicial lifetime. American Presidents
are elected, of course. But once they are in place they can wield
their promethian powers almost unaccountable for at least four
years, in which time they can easily destroy the world. i8 9
But this overlooks a crucial disanalogy. Policymaking decisions
by cabinet secretaries or presidents are decisions made by officials
who are either elected or accountable to those who have been elected.
Federal judges, the chief constitutional policymakers in the American
governmental system, are not electorally accountable at all. Nor are
their constitutional decisions reversible in the ordinary course of electoral politics.19 0
The crucial questions, then, are these: Are there sound reasons
for accepting the principle of electorally accountable policymaking as
a general principle? If so, are there also sound countervailing reasons
supporting the institution ofjudicial review by electorally unaccountablejudges? If so, are these countervailing reasons sufficiently compelling to justify the kind of strong judicial activism called for in
Dworkin's moral reading?
Dworkin's argument against the majoritarian premise significantly understates the strength of the case that can be made for the
principle of electorally accountable policymaking. That principle
serves a number of important values. 191 The two most important are
the values of popular sovereignty and political equality.

188 Equality, Democracy, and Constitution, supra note 5, at 325; cf. FREEDOM'S LAW,
supra note 14, at 28.
189 Equality, Democracy, and Constitution, supra note 5, at 325. For similar argu-

ments, see EUGENE V. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 152 (1962); William P. Bishin, JudicialReview in Democratic
Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1110 (1977).
190 See PERRY, supra note 184, at 32. For similar arguments, see BIcKEL, supra note
42, at 19-20; ELY, supra note 43, at 205-06 n.9.
191 See generally DAIL, supranote 171, at 135-52; MAYo, supranote 186, at 169-83,
213-43; ELAINE SPrrz, MAjoarrv RULE 149-68 (1984).
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Dworkin, as we saw earlier, 92 argues that the notion of popular
sovereignty or collective self-determination makes sense only on a
communal understanding of democratic self-government. He asks:
"Why am Ifree-how could I be thought to be governing myself-when
I must obey what other people decide even if I think it wrong or unwise or unfair to me or my family?" 193 Such "freedom," he says, is a
mere shibolleth on a majoritarian conception of democracy. Only if I
am a genuine moral member of a political community is an act of the
community in a meaningful sense my act, even when I may have opposed it or voted against it.
This argument assumes that popular sovereignty must be understood more or less literally as rule by the people. It is widely recognized, however, that in complex modern democracies the people
cannot and do not directly govern.' 94 To speak of "popular sovereignty" or "popular rule" is generally shorthand for the claim that all
political authority is ultimately derived from the people and is subject
to effective popular control. 195 In this standard, nonliteral sense, popular rule does not require the unanimous consent of the governed:
the sovereign power of the whole may legitimately be wielded by majorities or super-majorities of the electorate. 196 Thus understood,
popular sovereignty does not guarantee the necessary coincidence of
each citizen's individual will with the "general will" of the whole.
(What workable system of government could?) It does, however, as
Robert Dahl notes, maximize
the number of persons who can exercise self-determination in collective decisions. Given the boundaries of a particular political system, the composition of the demos, and the need for a collective
decision on some matter, the strong principle of majority rule ensures that the greatest possible number of citizens will live under
laws they have chosen for themselves. If a law is adopted by less
than a majority, then the number of citizens who would have chosen that law will necessarily be smaller than the number of citizens

192 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
193 FREEDoM's LAW, supra note 14, at 22.
194 See, e.g., COHEN, supranote 181, at 5; PM. MACIVER, THE WEB OF GOVEmNMENT
198 (1947); MAYO, supra note 186, at 58-59; ScHUMPETER, supra note 175, at 269.
195 See, e.g., DAHL, supranote 175, at 37; MAYO, supra note 186, at 172; Sprrz, supra
note 191, at 106-09; Wollheim, supra note 171, at 74.
196 The locus classicus of this view is, of course, Locke. SeeJOHN LoCKE, Two TR.TISES OF GovER mxr
349-50 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960); see also DAHL, supra note 175,
at 37; Sprrz, supra note 191, at 109-10.
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who would have chosen the alternative ....As a result, the alterna1 97
tive preferred by a minority would be imposed on the majority.
"Self-determination" is clearly being used here in a statistical
rather than a communal sense. Consequently, there is a straightforward statistical sense in which the value of self-determination supports
both the principle of majority rule in general and the principle of
electorally accountable policymaking in particular.
The second main justification for the principle of electorally accountable policymaking is that it respects the value of political equality. The key issue here, as Dworkin notes, is how "political equality"
should be understood. On a statistical understanding, he says, we can
think of political equality as either equal political power or as equal
political status. 198 The first is neither achievable nor desirable in
large-scale representative democracies. The second is desirable and
achievable, but is not inconsistent with activist judicial review by independent judges. Equal political status exists so long as no one is
treated as less worthy to participate in collective decisions than
others. 19 9 Judicial activism does not violate equal status in this sense,
and may in fact have a crucial role to play in achieving and preserving
it. Consequently, Dworkin argues, the ideal of political equality does
not support majority rule.
This argument also rests on a false dichotomy. Political equality
is a complex notion, 20 0 but the indispensable core elements are generally agreed to be those of (near) universal adult suffrage, the principle
of one person, one vote; and equal weighting of votes. 20 1 According
to this view, political equality is violated whenever any one individual
or minority group is "privileged to say in advance that regardless of
the distribution of opinions, his own or that of his group must pre197 DAHL, supranote 171, at 138 (emphasis added). For a fuller explication of the
argument, see Douglas W. Rae, Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional

Choice, 63 Am.POL. Sci. REv. 40 (1969).
198 See FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 27-28.
199 Id. at 28.
200 See generally DAHL, supra note 171, at 106-31; MAYO, supra note 186, at 62-64,
107-36.
201 See MAYO, supra note 186, at 63; NELSON, supra note 178, at 18-20; cf DAHL,
supra note 175, at 37 ("The condition of political equality is satisfied if and only if
control over governmental decisions is so shared that, whenever policy alternatives
are perceived to exist, in the choice of the alternative to be enforced as government
policy, the preference of each individual is assigned an equal value."). Nelson refers
to these as "formal equality conditions." NELSON, supra note 178, at 19. Such conditions neither presuppose nor entail equality of political power in Dworkin's more
robust sense.
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vail."202 In this sense, of course, political equality is an unattainable
ideal in a representative democracy. The "opinions" of senators or
other elected representatives will inevitably count more heavily in the
making of public policy decisions than those of ordinary citizens. But
political equality is seriously violated when vast swatches of public policy are left to be decided by nine unelected judges. Thus, while the
ideal of political equality does not justify the abandonment of representative government and its replacement by a pure participatory democracy, it does provide strong-if not conclusive-support for the
principle of electorally accountable policymaking.2 03
I must be careful not to be misunderstood. Thus far, I have argued only that there are sound reasons for accepting the principle of
electorally accountable policymaking as a general principle. It is a further question whether there are not also sound reasons supporting
judicial review by independent judges. Obviously, this is not the place
to reprise the voluminous post-Brown debate over the democratic legitimacy ofjudicial review. 204 Elsewhere I have argued that a cogent
case can be made for a moderately activist constitutional policymaking
role by an independentjudiciary.205 The gist of that defense is to argue, as Robert Dahl does,20 6 that popular sovereignty and political
equality, while important, are not absolute values: that at times these
values must yield to the overriding good of protecting basic liberties
and minority rights from hostile or oppressive majorities.2 07 Where
Dworkin and I differ most fundamentally is over the extent to which
democratic values properly operate as constraints on judicial constitutional activism. I argue that these constraints are significant; he argues that they are not.
In defending his moral reading of the Constitution, Dworkin recounts the story of a distinguished constitutional scholar who announced that he planned to spend the rest of his life looking for a
202 Benn, supra note 171, at 339.
203 Does this argument rest upon an excessively weak conception of political
equality? It would if I were suggesting that political equality consists in the three formal conditions discussed above. But that is not my claim. My claim, rather, is that any
defensible conception of political equality must include at least these conditions, and
that in virtue of these conditions strong judicial activism is presumptively suspect.
204
HAND,

See generally BICKEL, supra note 42;

supra note 36;

PERRY,

CHOPER,

supra note 176; ELY, supra note 43;

supra note 184.

205 See generally BASSHAM, supra note 48, at 91-127.
206 SeeDA-m, supranote 175, at 51; see also CHOPER, supranote 176, at 64-70; PERRY,
supra note 184, at 91-145.
207 There are, of course, additional reasons, both moral and pragmatic, for the
institution ofjudicial review. See generallyELY, supra note 43, at 73-104; PERRY, supra
note 184, at 37-60.
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defensible interpretive strategy somewhere between originalism and
20 9
the moral reading.20 8 "Why?" Dworkin asks.
Because, to echo Cass Sunstein, Earl Warren is dead. 2 10 So too is
originalism. The debate, rightly, has moved on.

208
209
210

See FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 14.
Id.
See Sunstein, supra note 13.

